Commodity prices, commodity currencies, and global economic developments by Paolo A. Pesenti & Jan J.J. Groen
Summary for non-specialists 
Economic Papers No. 440 / March 2011 
Economic Papers index 
 
 
Commodity prices, commodity currencies, 
and global economic developments 
 
by Jan Groen and Paolo Pesenti  
 
Have economists and analysts reached some pragmatic consensus on how to predict 
movements in commodity prices? As considered in this paper, there is no easy answer. While 
we are not necessarily pessimistic about the possibility of obtaining serviceable forecasts for 
near-term commodity price inflation, our results throw cold water on excessive hopes of 
accuracy and reliability. 
In the paper, we do not  attempt to answer questions such as "why are commodity prices so 
persistently high or low" or "how long before they start affecting inflation expectations".  Our 
purpose is more modest. Our forecast variables are cross-commodity price indices (we 
consider 10 indices in total, taken from four distinct sources, and going as far back as 1973), 
and we assess the extent to which the information from a large dataset of indicators of global 
conditions may help predicting future movements of these indices. 
To put our results in the context of the relevant literature, it may be useful to summarize 
briefly the approaches usually adopted to forecast commodity prices. 
The first approach argues that economic modeling is not particularly helpful. The best 
information one can use to predict future prices is the one embedded in current and past 
prices. Thus, to obtain the best out-of-sample prediction one could just estimate a simple 
statistical autoregressive process (what goes up must come down) or a random walk 
specification (tomorrow’s prices are today’s prices). Let’s call this the “atheist” approach. 
At the opposite extreme is the claim that commodity prices would be easily predictable if one 
only used the right tools, the right theory, the right model. Let’s call this the “true believer” 
approach. In the paper we discuss several examples of this approach. For instance, some have 
recently emphasized that exchange rate fluctuations of relatively small and predominantly 
commodity-exporting economies such as Australia, Chile or South Africa are privileged 
predictors of future global commodity prices.  Primary commodity products represent 
significant components of output in the above-mentioned countries, affecting a large fraction 
of their export earnings.  At the same time these countries are too small to have much of an 
impact on world markets. This implies that global commodity price changes represent external shocks for these countries, and their exchange rates move today in anticipation of 
future terms of trade adjustment. 
Finally, some are unwilling or unable to take a stand and choose among the glut of “true 
beliefs”.  Let’s call this approach “agnostic” (whatever works, we'll take it). Pragmatically, 
this translates into throwing into the cauldron of possible predictors disparate things like 
macro-economic time series across major developed and developing countries  (e.g., 
industrial production, business and consumer confidence data. retail sales volumes, money 
aggregates and interest rates), data on inventories and production of industrial metals and 
energy commodities, and data on ocean shipping costs across many different routes. To distill 
the relevant information from such a brew of raw data, in our paper we use partial least 
squares (PLS) regressions which – heuristically – maximize the covariance between the 
common components extracted from the large dataset of predictors and future commodity 
price changes.  
To make a long story short, in the paper we obtain different sets of forecasts based on 
different “atheist”, “true believers” or “agnostic” approaches.  And the winner is… 
Well, there is no obvious winner. Information from large panels of global economic variables 
can help, but their forecasting properties are by no means overwhelming. It all depends on the 
choice of the specific index and the forecasting horizon. For example, for one specific   
commodity price index, PLS regressions provide significantly better predictions than both 
autoregressive and random walk benchmarks when used to forecast one-month and one-
quarter ahead commodity prices. But when the forecasting horizon is 6 months or longer, the 
forecast performance of PLS regressions is no better than the statistical benchmarks. PLS 
does perform relatively better with aggregate commodity price indices than with commodity 
sub-indices such as metals or energy. 
If we focus on specific subsets of explanatory variables – as emphasized by the “true 
believers” –we do find mild but not overwhelming evidence for the notion that commodity 
currencies are privileged predictors. We find even less empirical support to the notion that 
commodity futures have strong predictive power.  
 
Ultimately, the basic message is one of inconclusiveness. No easy generalization or pattern 
emerges, and the results look almost random.  In fact, we are unable to generate forecasts that 
are, on average, structurally more accurate and robust than those based on a random walk or 
autoregressive specifications. If a policy lesson can be drawn from our results, is that one 
should be very cautious when interpreting the forecast of a forthcoming commodity price 
surge as an early signal of recrudescence in global headline inflation.  As forecasts of 
commodity prices provide only highly noisy hints about their actual future trajectories and 
persistence, excessive confidence in such forecasts may bias policymakers' views and beliefs 
about future inflation risks in the direction of a premature - and unwarranted - tightening of 
the global policy mix. 
 